






 
|
Taxonomy and description
The nature of light rail
The growth of light rail
The cost of light rail
Light rail as an instrument of
policy
The nature of light rail
Light
rail is a modern form of public transport that runs on rails. It shares
many characteristics with heavy rail system such as metros and suburban
rail, but has lower capacity. Its main advantage over these other systems
is that it is cheaper and more flexible since it can be operated on the
road in mixed traffic. Generally this is not advisable since it will suffer
from the effects of congestion, but it can also be run at the margin or
along the median of highways. Usually it has a much simpler signalling
than heavier rail systems, often relying on the driver's judgement in
a similar manner to the driver of a bus, particularly in mixed traffic
conditions. When it is running along a highway it can be given priority
at signalised junctions. Light rail can also be elevated or built in tunnel.
Often a combination of these is used to match local circumstances, for
example by using disused railway embankments to provide a fast interurban
route with street running in town centres.
Light
rail is nearly always powered by electricity which is usually supplied
through overhead wires, but can be supplied through a third rail system.
The latter can only be used when the system is completely segregated from
the public except at stations. It is also possible to have driverless
automatic systems which also have to be segregated.
Light rail has much in common with the tram. In some ways it is simply
a modern version of the tram, but in some cities, such as Amsterdam and
Melbourne where there are extensive tram systems, light rail lines are
being built, often with some segregation, to provide high speed links
to areas not previously served by trams. Generally, light rail is modern,
has at least some segregation from other traffic, and is powered by electricity.
New systems are usually the subject of extensive marketing campaigns,
and branded with a suitable name such as 'Metrolink' or 'Supertram'.

The growth of light rail
Light rail has grown in popularity in recent years. Since 1970, 61 metros
and 78 light rail systems have opened as Babalik (2000) has shown, using
data from Taplin (1997, 2000). Given the complexity of definition it is
difficult to be clear which was the first modern light rail system. Rogers
(1975) recognises the system in Edmonton in Canada which opened in 1976
as the first, regarding all previous examples as extensions to, or rehabilitation
of, existing tram systems. Number of light rail systems and metros opened
since 1970 shows the distribution of new light rail systems around the
World. It also shows the number of new metros for comparison.
| Number of light rail systems and metros opened since 1970 |
| |
Light rail systems
|
Metros
|
| |
1970s
|
1980s
|
1990s
|
1970s
|
1980s
|
1990s
|
|
Western Europe
|
0
|
7
|
14
|
7
|
2
|
4
|
|
North America
|
1
|
13
|
8
|
3
|
2
|
1
|
|
Rest of the World
|
4
|
17
|
12
|
13
|
17
|
12
|
|
Total
|
5
|
37
|
32
|
23
|
21
|
17
|
Source: Babalik (2000) based on Taplin (1997, 2000).
It can be seen that in the 1970s (and in the preceding decades) the number
of metros built outnumbered the number of light rail systems. Since then
the picture has reversed completely, with 69 new light rail systems opened
since 1980 compared with 38 new metros. North America led this trend in
the 1980s, but since then most activity has been elsewhere. Now there
are more light rail systems than metros in Western Europe and North America
(Babalik, 2000).
The cost of light rail
Light rail is not cheap. Babalik (2000) has collected data on a number
of systems around the World. The cost of light rail systems (and metros)
shows data for 23 light rail systems, plus four metros for comparison.
| The cost of light rail systems (and metros) |
|
Country
|
City
|
Route length in km
|
Capital cost in £
million at 1998 prices
|
Annual operating costs
in 1998 in £ million
|
Fare revenue in 1997
in £ million
|
Notes
|
|
Canada
|
Calgary
|
29
|
643
|
6
|
N/A
|
One of the highest capital costs
for a non-automatic systems
|
|
|
Edmonton
|
14
|
362
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
|
Scarborough
|
7
|
184
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Automatic system
|
|
|
Vancouver
|
29
|
843
|
22
|
8
|
One of the highest capital costs
– being automatic adds to capital cost (extra technology and complete
segregation)
|
|
France
|
Grenoble
|
18
|
247
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
|
Nantes
|
26
|
271
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
|
Paris
|
9
|
67
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
|
Rouen
|
15
|
256
|
24
|
9
|
|
|
|
Strasbourg
|
11
|
207
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
Switzerland
|
Lausanne
|
8
|
70
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
The lowest capital cost system (8km)
|
|
UK
|
London Docklands
|
28
|
775
|
N/A
|
12
|
One of the highest capital costs
– being automatic adds to capital cost (extra technology and complete
segregation)
|
|
|
Manchester
|
31
|
176
|
9
|
13
|
|
|
|
Sheffield
|
29
|
271
|
9
|
5
|
|
|
|
Tyne and Wear
|
59
|
533
|
27
|
21
|
|
|
USA
|
Baltimore
|
49
|
503
|
15
|
4
|
|
|
|
Dallas
|
32
|
353
|
18
|
N/A
|
|
|
|
Denver
|
9
|
141
|
5
|
N/A
|
Lowest operating costs
|
|
|
Los Angeles
|
57
|
717
|
34
|
3
|
One of the highest capital costs
for a non-automatic systems; highest operating costs
|
|
|
Portland
|
24
|
309
|
15
|
3
|
|
|
|
Sacramento
|
30
|
165
|
10
|
4
|
|
|
|
San Diego
|
80
|
609
|
17
|
10
|
One of the highest capital costs
for a non-automatic systems; longest light rail system but not highest
operating costs
|
|
|
San Jose
|
32
|
527
|
17
|
3
|
|
|
|
St Louis
|
29
|
260
|
13
|
5
|
|
|
USA
|
Atlanta
|
62
|
3679
|
63
|
20
|
|
|
Metros
|
Baltimore
|
25
|
1136
|
22
|
6
|
Noticeably higher capital costs than
light rail
|
|
|
Los Angeles
|
18
|
1278
|
21
|
1
|
Noticeably higher capital costs than
light rail
|
|
|
Miami
|
33
|
1058
|
32
|
9
|
Noticeably higher capital costs than
light rail
|
|
|
Washington DC
|
144
|
7372
|
190
|
N/A
|
Noticeably higher capital costs than
light rail and operating costs (a much longer system)
|
Source: Babalik (2000)
Note: N/A indicates that data were not available.
Capital costs represent the value of the investment in the year 1998.
All costs and revenues are in UK Sterling at 1998 prices with currency
conversions made using the purchasing power parity index provided by OECD
(obtainable from http://www.oecd.org//std/nadata.htm).
The cost of a system is influenced by many factors including its size.
It is also useful to consider costs in terms of patronage, and to compare
operating costs and revenue to see how close to profitability the system
is. Cost and revenue indicators for light rail (and metro) systems show
the capital cost per kilometre of route, the annualised capital cost per
passenger, the operating cost per passenger, the fare revenue per passenger,
and the farebox recovery ratio, which is the ratio of revenue to operating
costs. For comparison, the five metros are also included.

| Cost and revenue indicators for light rail (and metro) systems |
|
City
|
Capital cost/km
£ million
|
Annualised capital
cost/
passenger £
|
Operating cost/ passenger
|
Fare revenue/
passenger
|
Farebox recovery ratio
(%)
|
Notes
|
|
Calgary
|
22
|
1.27
|
0.14
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Lowest operating cost
per passenger
|
|
Edmonton
|
26
|
2.92
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Relatively high capital
costs per km, but was the first modern system
|
|
Scarborough
|
28
|
4.34
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
One of the most expensive
capital costs per km – an automatic system
|
|
Vancouver
|
29
|
1.67
|
0.53
|
0.19
|
38
|
One of the most expensive
capital costs per km – an automatic system
|
|
Grenoble
|
13
|
0.90
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Over 20 million passengers
per year
|
|
Nantes
|
10
|
0.86
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Over 20 million passengers
per year
|
|
Paris
|
7
|
0.32
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
Rouen
|
17
|
1.50
|
1.73
|
0.64
|
37
|
|
|
Strasbourg
|
18
|
0.96
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
Lausanne
|
9
|
0.80
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
London Docklands
|
28
|
3.04
|
N/A
|
0.72
|
N/A
|
One of the most expensive
capital costs per km – an automatic system
|
|
Manchester
|
6
|
1.05
|
0.69
|
0.99
|
143
|
Over 20 million passengers
per year
|
|
Sheffield
|
9
|
2.42
|
1.15
|
0.60
|
52
|
|
|
Tyne and Wear
|
9
|
1.25
|
0.76
|
0.58
|
77
|
About 35 million passengers
per year
|
|
Baltimore
|
10
|
5.87
|
2.14
|
0.53
|
28
|
High operating cost
per passenger – reflection of low patronage, 7 million passengers
per year
|
|
Dallas
|
11
|
2.65
|
1.66
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
Denver
|
17
|
2.42
|
1.09
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
|
|
Los Angeles
|
13
|
2.47
|
1.41
|
0.15
|
7
|
Over 20 million passengers
per year
|
|
Portland
|
13
|
2.15
|
1.23
|
0.25
|
20
|
|
|
Sacramento
|
6
|
1.68
|
1.20
|
0.49
|
40
|
|
|
San Diego
|
8
|
2.18
|
0.76
|
0.55
|
68
|
Over 20 million passengers
per year
|
|
San Jose
|
16
|
6.27
|
2.49
|
0.48
|
20
|
Highest operating
cost per passenger – reflection of low patronage, 7 million passengers
per year
|
|
St Louis
|
9
|
1.47
|
0.87
|
0.37
|
46
|
|
|
Atlanta Metro
|
59
|
3.89
|
0.82
|
0.23
|
32
|
Notably higher capital
costs per km
|
|
Baltimore Metro
|
46
|
7.28
|
1.73
|
0.51
|
31
|
Notably higher capital
costs per km
|
|
Los Angeles Metro
|
71
|
8.57
|
1.72
|
0.06
|
4
|
Notably higher capital
costs per km
|
|
Miami Metro
|
32
|
6.46
|
2.40
|
0.67
|
29
|
Notably higher capital
costs per km
|
|
Washington DC Metro
|
51
|
2.85
|
1.13
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Notably higher capital
costs per km
|
Source: Babalik (2000).
Note: N/A indicates that data were not available.
All costs are in UK Sterling at 1998 prices.
The capital cost has been annualised by discounting the capital cost in
the year 1998 over 30 years at 8%. This has been done for all systems
to allow comparisons. It is not necessarily how it was originally done
for economic evaluation of the scheme.
The variation in capital costs arises because of the different types
of structure required: tunnel, elevated or at grade, the existing infrastructure
(often disused railway trackbeds can be reused) and the quantity of utilities
(gas, electricity, water and telecommunications) that have to be moved
(rail-based transport systems cannot run over utilities because if a utility
pipe or cable has to be repaired, the transport system cannot function,
unlike a bus which can be diverted to another route). A major expense,
typically about one quarter of the total cost of systems built recently
in Britain, is the movement of utilities from under the road. Another
element of the cost is land acquisition. If land has to be acquired, this
may be very expensive, particularly if it is currently occupied by housing
or economic activity. Nevertheless, it can be seen that, in general, light
rail systems are, despite being expensive, much cheaper to construct than
metros, which partly explains their increasing popularity as was shown
by number of light rail systems and metros opened since 1970. Putting
it another way, the lower cost per km of light rail means that it may
be regarded as feasible to develop a system in a city which is too small
to support a metro. Additionally, because the capacity of light rail vehicles
is high, it is possible to have low operating costs per member of staff,
possibly lower than on buses. Operating costs can be high, but it does
not necessarily matter if the revenue is also high. The relationship between
these two figures is expressed as the farebox recovery ratio, which is
the percentage of operating costs covered by fare revenue. It can be seen
that only Manchester Metrolink covers its operating costs. It is run privately
under a franchise agreement, and there is no subsidy to the operator.
The private sector operator is only interested in operating the system
if a profit can be made. The next nearest to making a profit is Tyne and
Wear Metro in Britain in which 77% of the costs are covered. This is an
older system which is still publicly owned. After that comes the San Diego
Trolley, which covers 68% of its costs. The San Diego Trolley is interesting
because it was initially built with no funding from the Federal Government,
with funding coming from state petrol tax. This meant that construction
could start sooner and that various regulations, for example, prohibiting
the purchase of vehicles from overseas, regulations, such as prohibition
of importing vehicles, could be avoided (Wolinsky, 1994). Sheffield Supertram
was privatised in December 1997 and now receives no operating subsidy.
The metro systems do not perform any better financially than the light
rail systems, with three of them covering about 30% of their costs through
the farebox, and Los Angeles Metro only recovering 4%. In general, the
light rail systems perform better than the metros. This may partly explain
the growth in their popularity as discussed above: they are cheaper to
build and they perform at least as well as a metro in financial terms.
It can be seen that some systems are nowhere near covering their operating
costs, such as the light rail systems in Los Angeles, Portland and San
Jose. This raises the question as to whether this was due to incompetence
in the development and operation of the system or whether they were developed
for non-financial objectives with the subsidy required regarded as a cost
to be paid in order to meet the objectives. The issue of why light rail
systems are built will be considered in the next section.
It is worth noting that a number of commentators, particularly in the
US, have criticised the development of light rail schemes for being extravagant
and inappropriate uses of resources, even going as far as claiming that
deceit has been used, for example in Dallas (Kain, 1990). Part of the
problem has been that for a number of years the US Federal Government
provided some funding for new urban pubic transport systems, with the
amount of funding provided a function of the predicted level of patronage.
Hence there was an incentive for planners to be optimistic in their forecasts
of patronage. Pickrell (1992) demonstrated that there were significant
differences between the forecast levels of patronage and those subsequently
observed. A related concern is that money invested in light rail has not
been well spent. Gomez-Ibanez (1985) examined the light rail systems in
San Diego, Calgary and Edmonton. He found that not only were rail-based
systems more expensive to construct than bus-based systems, but that the
operating costs were higher. The systems did increase public transport
patronage, but only modestly and at a high cost. He concluded that investment
in bus-based systems would have been more cost-effective. Kain (1988)
came to similar conclusions about the Los Angeles and Dallas systems.

Light rail as an instrument of policy
Before considering the impact of light rail as a policy instrument it
is very important to consider why such systems are developed. It is not
reasonable to criticise systems for not achieving certain objectives if
such objectives were not amongst the objectives the systems were designed
to meet.
A study of the decision process underlying the choice of technology (metro,
light rail, guided bus or
conventional bus) for a number of systems around the World was carried
out in the Centre for Transport Studies at University College London in
1991-1994 under the UTOPIA
project. As part of that work interviews were held with a number of experts
involved in the development of some systems to collect information on
various aspects of the decision-making process including discussion on
why the systems were developed. A postal survey was carried out on other
systems. The status of systems examined for their objectives are shown,
as are the objectives for developing the systems cited by the experts.
| Status of systems examined for their objectives |
|
Country
|
City
|
Type of system
|
Status
|
|
Australia
|
Brisbane
|
Light rail
|
Abandoned
|
|
|
Melbourne
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Sydney
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
Canada
|
Calgary
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Scarborough
|
Automatic light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Vancouver
|
Automatic light rail
|
Operational
|
|
China
|
Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
Denmark
|
Copenhagen
|
Automatic light rail
|
Planned
|
|
Sweden
|
Stockholm
|
Light rail
|
Planned
|
|
Switzerland
|
Lausanne
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
UK
|
Croydon
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Leeds
|
Light rail
|
Planned
|
|
|
London Docklands
|
Automatic light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Manchester
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Nottingham
|
Light rail
|
Planned
|
|
|
Sheffield
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Tyne and Wear
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
West Midlands
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
USA
|
Baltimore
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Dallas
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
Honolulu
|
Light rail
|
Abandoned
|
|
|
Kansas City
|
Light rail
|
Planned
|
|
|
Sacramento
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
San Diego
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
|
|
San Jose
|
Light rail
|
Operational
|
Source: Mackett and Edwards (1998).
Note: The surveys upon which these data were based were carried out in
1992-1994. The status information has been updated.
An example that relates development to travel demand was Dallas where
the new system was designed to enable companies to choose locations that
would enable them to meet their legal obligations to reduce the number
of cars being used by their employees.
Clearly, it is believed that light rail systems can help to stimulate
development. It is not clear what the mechanism is that underlies this
process. Some experts suggested that the mechanisms are related to 'image',
'confidence' and so on. The only evidence cited was in the case of Leeds
(Pope, 1994) where a survey of businessmen showed that many of them would
support the investment in a new public transport system. Apparently some
of the major store chains would be more likely to expand their shops in
Leeds if such a system were developed.
| Objectives of developing light rail systems |
|
City
|
To improve public transport
|
To reduce traffic congestion
|
To
improve the environ-
ment
|
To serve the city centre better
|
To stimulate develop-
ment
|
Other
|
|
Brisbane
|
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
|
Melbourne
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
|
|
Sydney
|
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
|
Calgary
|
|
·
|
·
|
|
·
|
|
|
Scarborough
|
·
|
|
|
·
|
·
|
·
|
|
Vancouver
|
|
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
|
·
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copenhagen
|
·
|
·
|
·
|
|
·
|
|
|
Stockholm
|
·
|
·
|
·
|
|
|
·
|
|
Lausanne
|
·
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
|
Croydon
|
·
|
·
|
|
|
·
|
·
|
|
Leeds
|
·
|
|
|
|
·
|
·
|
|
London Docklands
|
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
|
Manchester
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
·
|
|
Nottingham
|
|
·
|
|
·
|
·
|
|
|
Sheffield
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tyne and Wear
|
·
|
|
|
·
|
|
·
|
|
West Midlands
|
·
|
·
|
|
·
|
·
|
|
|
Baltimore
|
·
|
·
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
Dallas
|
·
|
·
|
|
|
·
|
·
|
|
Honolulu
|
|
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
Kansas City
|
|
|
|
|
·
|
|
|
Sacramento
|
·
|
|
·
|
|
|
|
|
San Diego
|
|
·
|
·
|
|
|
·
|
|
San Jose
|
|
·
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Mackett and Edwards (1998).
Note: The information in this table is based upon interviews and postal
surveys of experts involved in the development of the systems. For the
list of experts see Mackett and Edwards (1998). The surveys upon which
these data were based were carried out in 1995-1996.
The objectives of developing light rail systems indicate that the most
popular reason for developing the systems was to stimulate development.
In three cases, Brisbane, Copenhagen and London Docklands, the light rail
system was an integral part of the redevelopment of a large area. For
the Calgary, Croydon, Leeds and Dallas systems, the objective was to help
stimulate development in the city centre by providing easier access to
the economic activities there. General promotion of economic development
in the urban area was cited for Nottingham, Baltimore and Kansas City.
It was the only major objective in the case of Kansas City.
The second most common objective cited was 'to improve public transport'.
It might be argued that this is axiomatic, but usually it was linked to
a social objective, for example, providing better access for those without
a car. A related issue is that of serving the city centre, because segregated
public transport is very good at this, as it can serve efficiently the
main corridors which focus on the city centre where most economic activity
takes place and interchange is easier. An interesting variant on this
is to provide transport from the inner city where there is often high
unemployment outwards to newer employment centres. This was mentioned
for the Croydon, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands systems.
'To reduce traffic congestion' was cited in 10 cases, implying that a
significant transfer of trips from car to the new system was anticipated.
In five cases, 'To improve the environment' was cited. Generally this
means reducing atmospheric emissions from cars and so is related to reducing
car use. These two reasons imply that some planners believe that developing
new light rail schemes can reduce car use significantly.
The 'other' reasons include a variety of factors. For example, the Manchester
and Tyne and Wear systems were developed as ways of dealing with heavy
rail lines in need of renewal. Replacing heavy rail by light rail meant
that the system could be brought into the city centre to improve access
there. In Dallas, a prime motivating factor was to help to promote Dallas
as a 'World city'. The logic was that all 'World cities' have a modern
public transport system so Dallas had to have one.
It has been shown that a number of policy initiatives underlie the development
of new light rail systems. These relate to improving public transport,
reducing car use, improving city centre access and stimulating development.
In the next section the theoretical concepts underlying these ideas will
be examined.

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